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I. Introduction 
All fields of knowledge are shaped by ideas that travel in time and space. From history to 
economics to the natural sciences, the circulation of ideas is both ‘a fact of life and a usefully 
enabling condition of intellectual activity’.1 Law is no exception. As Roscoe Pound remarked in 
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The Formative Era of American Law (1938), the ‘history of a system of law is largely a history 
of borrowings of legal materials from other legal systems and of assimilation of materials from 
outside of the law.’2 The development of the English common law, the Roman-Canonic jus 
commune, and the advent of constitutionalism in the second half of the twentieth century are 
examples of phenomena in which the circulation of legal norms and ideas changed not only legal 
systems but also the course of history.  
The study of legal transplants in comparative law aims to understand how the complex 
dynamic of cross-jurisdictional legal transfers brings legal systems into contact and eventually 
causes them to change.3 For most of the twentieth century, comparative legal studies focused 
almost exclusively on rules of private law. Constitutional norms, and public law generally,4 were 
perceived as too enmeshed with politics to allow for the same rigorous and systematic treatment 
that could be applied to the study of contract or property law.  
And yet, instances of constitutional borrowing are now everywhere. Not only has the idea 
of a (written) constitution spread to virtually every corner of the world but also constitutions are 
gaining recognition as enforceable legal documents, rather than mere declarations. The 
                                                                                                                                                             
1
 Edward Said, The World, the Text, and the Critic (1983), 226.  
2
 Roscoe Pound, The Formative Era of American Law (1938), 94.  
3
 See Alan Watson, Legal Transplants (1974).  
4
 This chapter discusses exclusively comparative constitutional law; it does not integrate other 
forms of comparative public law, such as comparative administrative law. For a recent overview 
of that field, see Susan Rose-Ackerman and Peter L. Lindseth, Comparative Administrative Law 
(2010). For a discussion of cross-jurisdictional influence, see Tim Koopmans, ‘Globalization of 
Administrative Law—The European Experience’ in Gordon Anthony et al, Values in Global 
Administrative Law (2011), 400ff.  
 3 
institution of judicial review, the principle of the separation of powers, and the enactment of a 
bill of rights have become fixtures on the world constitutional map. As one scholar noted, 
‘Reading across any large set of constitutional texts, it is striking how similar their language is; 
reading the history of any nation’s constitution making, it is striking how much self-conscious 
borrowing goes on.’5 Much the same can be said about borrowing at the subsequent stages of 
constitutional application and interpretation. Courts around the world, from Israel to Brazil and 
from South Korea to Canada and Hungary often consult the work of their foreign peers in 
interpreting similarly worded constitutional provisions. Faster means of communication, the ease 
of travel, and the globalization of legal education contribute to the intensification of 
constitutional borrowing. As Sujit Choudhry has recently noted, ‘the migration of constitutional 
ideas across legal systems is rapidly emerging as one of the central features of contemporary 
constitutional practice.’6 
These developments make it all the more surprising that constitutional borrowing as a 
standalone topic has been rather marginal in comparative constitutional law. While scholars in 
the field study various aspects of how constitutional systems interact, the mechanics of cross-
constitutional interaction rarely receive comprehensive treatment. As late as 1990, a 
bibliographical study concluded that the literature on cross-border influence was ‘virtually 
                                                 
5
 Robert Goodwin, ‘Designing Constitutions: The Political Constitution of a Mixed 
Commonwealth’ in Richard Bellamy and Dario Castiglione (eds), Constitutionalism in 
Transformation: European and Theoretical Perspectives (1996), 223.  
6
 Sujit Choudhry, ‘Migration as a New Metaphor in Comparative Constitutional Law’ in Sujit 
Choudhry (ed), The Migration of Constitutional Ideas (2006), 16.  
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inexistent’.7 More recently, Ran Hirschl noted that ‘from a methodological standpoint, we have 
yet to encounter a coherent theory of inter-court constitutional borrowing.’8 Nothing resembling 
the transplants debate in comparative private law can yet be found in the field of comparative 
constitutional law.  
At one level, this should not necessarily cause concern. The transplants debate in 
comparative private law became deadlocked in a polarized contest between scholars arguing that 
transplants can be found everywhere and other scholars who proclaimed legal transplants 
impossible because law is embedded in culture and cultures cannot be transplanted. That debate 
obscured as much as it illuminated the relationship between law and its broader cultural 
environment. Moreover, as we will see, the field of comparative constitutional law is already 
developing on its own rich ways of conceptualizing the interplay between (constitutional) law 
and (constitutional) culture.  
Nevertheless, comparative constitutional law is comparative law. And comparative legal 
studies have much to offer, at both conceptual and normative levels, for thinking about legal 
borrowing in general. Understanding the many dangers associated with borrowing in the 
constitutional context—dangers involving misunderstanding, exclusion, or limitations of self-
government and democratic experimentalism—is enhanced by recourse to the traditions and 
formative debates of comparative law. Perhaps more than anything else, such recourse can help 
                                                 
7
 Andrzej Rapaczynski, ‘Bibliographical Essay: The Influence of US Constitutionalism Abroad’ 
in Louis Henkin and Albert Rosenthal (eds), Constitutionalism and Rights (1990), 406. 
8
 Ran Hirschl, ‘On the Blurred Methodological Matrix of Comparative Constitutional Law’ in 
Choudhry (n 6), 43.  
 5 
to infuse the field of comparative constitutional law with a much-tested comparative 
sensibility—that ‘usefully enabling condition of intellectual activity’. 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section II discusses terminology. The choice of 
metaphors is central to comparative private and constitutional law and should be the starting 
point for an overview of the topic. Section III introduces the transplants debate in comparative 
private law and discusses the distinction between private and public, specifically constitutional, 
law. Section IV is a prolegomena to an anatomy of constitutional transplants that draws, 
whenever possible, on the resources of comparative private law. It includes an analysis of the 
object of constitutional transplants, their timing, motivations, and patterns. The justification of 
constitutional patterns is discussed in Section V, in the context of the use of foreign law in 
constitutional adjudication as a specific form of constitutional borrowing. The chapter concludes 
with a brief meditation on the topic of constitutional convergence.  
II. Terminology: The Battle of Metaphors  
A survey of the literature reveals great concern about the choice of metaphors to capture cross-
constitutional interactions.9 Available options include ‘transplants’, ‘diffusion’, ‘borrowing’, 
‘circulation’, ‘cross-fertilization’, ‘migration’, ‘engagement’, ‘influence’, ‘transmission’, 
‘transfer’, and ‘reception’. Four of these metaphors have had greater staying power: ‘transplants’ 
and its ‘borrowing’ equivalent in comparative constitutional law; ‘circulation’ and its ‘migration’ 
equivalent in comparative constitutional law.  
                                                 
9
 See also Michele Graziadei, ‘Comparative Law and the Study of Transplants and Receptions’ 
in Mathias Reimann and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative 
Law (2006), 443ff. 
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Alan Watson’s Legal Transplants (1974) brought this concept to the center of 
comparative legal studies.10 A scholar of legal history, Watson’s study of the English common 
law and of the reception of Roman law in continental Europe led him to conclude that foreign 
transplants are the main mechanism by which private law evolves. Because legal rules are 
largely autonomous from the larger social and cultural surroundings, their transplant across 
jurisdictions is ‘socially easy’.11 Comparative law properly so called should therefore study the 
interaction between legal systems through the mechanism of legal transplants.  
As we will see in the next section, the mechanistic overtones of ‘transplants’ have not 
traveled well to comparative constitutional law. ‘Borrowing’ is the analogous metaphor used to 
capture the phenomena of constitutional transplants. The inaugural symposium of the premier 
peer-review journal in the field, the International Journal of Constitutional Law, was dedicated 
to constitutional borrowing.12 However, critics have argued that ‘borrowing’ is a deceiving 
metaphor. Leading the charge, Kim Lane Scheppele has pointed out that borrowing signifies a 
voluntary exchange among equals whereby the borrowed good will be returned unmodified, after 
a determined period, to the lender who remains its owner. That description does not apply to 
constitutional transfers. Unlike consumer goods, constitutional norms are not owned by 
particular legal system. They can be modified in the process of transfer and are not to be 
                                                 
10
 It took comparative law as an academic discipline a little over seven decades, counting from 
the 1900 Congress of Paris, to turn to the question of transplants. See Michele Graziadei, 
‘Comparative Law and the Study of Transplants and Receptions’ in Reimann and Zimmermann 
(n 9), 442ff. 
11
 Watson (n 3), 95. 
12
 ‘Symposium on Constitutional Borrowing’ (2003) 1 International Journal of Constitutional 
Law 177. 
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‘returned’ at term. Finally, borrowing implies consent when in fact not all instances of 
constitutional transfer are voluntary.13 
The proposed alternative to constitutional borrowing is constitutional ‘migration’.14 The 
fluidity of this new metaphor is said to capture more accurately the complex dynamic of cross-
constitutional exchanges. By contrast to the misleading linearity of borrowing, migrations 
describe  
all movements across systems, overt or covert, episodic or incremental, planned or evolved, initiated by the 
giver or receiver, accepted or rejected, adopted or adapted, concerned with substantive doctrine or with 
institutional design or some more abstract or intangible constitutional sensibility or ethos.15  
Interestingly, the shift from borrowing to migration mirrors a similar shift in comparative law 
from transplant to ‘circulation’.16  
The battle of metaphors is not ‘transcendental nonsense’. Only a sufficiently transparent 
and capacious lens can capture the complexity of cross-constitutional interactions.17 Consider, 
                                                 
13
 Kim Lane Scheppele, ‘Aspirational and Adversative Constitutionalism: The Case for Studying 
Cross-constitutional Influence through Negative Models’ (2003) 1 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 296, 296ff; Kim Lane Scheppele, ‘The Migration of Anti-constitutional 
Ideas: The Post-9/11 Globalization of Public Law and the International State of Emergency’ in 
Choudhry (n 6), 347ff.  
14
 See generally Choudhry (n 6). 
15
 Neil Walker, ‘The Migration of Constitutional Ideas and the Migration of the Constitutional 
Idea: The Case of the EU’ in Choudhry (n 6), 320–1. 
16
 Edward M. Wise, ‘The Transplant of Legal Patterns’ (1990) 38 American Journal of 
Comparative Law Supplement 1. 
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for example, the rejection of foreign models. If comparative law aims to understand the 
interaction between constitutional systems, then instances of rejection of foreign norms are 
presumably just as relevant as instances when such norms are incorporated.18 One learns as much 
about Poland from its rejection of an American-style structure of government model in 1919 as 
one does from Poland’s adoption of a French-inspired constitution two years later.19 Proponents 
of the migration metaphor worry that these sorts of constitutional interactions are less visible 
when one looks for instances of borrowing: ‘the traditional focus of cross-constitutional 
influence only on ‘constitutional borrowings’ tends to highlight the positive models and hide 
negative ones.’20  
                                                                                                                                                             
17
 See also Günter Frankenberg, ‘Constitutional Transfer: The IKEA Theory Revisited’ (2010) 8 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 563,  566:  
These [metaphors] . . . are not ‘only words’ but signifiers of rather different theoretical approaches and 
interpretations, at times deployed casually, at others defended with religious zeal.  
18
 It has been argued that type and intensity of rejection is also relevant. Kim Lane Scheppele has 
distinguished situations when foreign options are considered and rejected in favor of alternatives 
must be differentiated from cases where the foreign models are perceived as so abhorrent as to 
endanger the very identity of the receiving system. See Kim Lane Scheppele, ‘Aspirational and 
Adversative Constitutionalism: The Case for Studying Cross-constitutional Influence through 
Negative Models’ (2003) 1 International Journal of Constitutional Law 296, 303ff. See also 
Heinz Klug, ‘Model and Anti-Model: The United States Constitution and the “Rise of World 
Constitutionalism”’ (2000) Wisconsin Law Review 597.  
19
 Wiktor Osiatynski, ‘Paradoxes of Constitutional Borrowing’ (2003) 1 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 244, 250.  
20
 Kim Lane Scheppele, ‘Aspirational and Adversative Constitutionalism: The Case for Studying 
Cross-constitutional Influence through Negative Models’ (2003) 1 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 296. 
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At one level, this is an odd claim since nothing prevents scholars from researching, as 
some have,21 instances of non-borrowing. But it is true that such projects are few and far 
between. So a deeper shift is at work here, and it has to do with the comparative agenda itself. 
The exclusive focus on borrowing, just like a focus on transplants, is primarily concerned with 
the mechanics of constitutional transfer and the interaction among constitutional systems. By 
contrast, non-borrowing reveals as much about a given constitutional order as it does about the 
dynamic between systems. The shift from borrowing to migration, or circulation, takes some of 
the emphasis away from the interaction itself and toward the deeper causes that lead systems to 
interact or to refuse interaction. As one author put it, interaction becomes an ‘interpretative 
foil’22 for exposing a constitutional system’s deeper normative structures.  
 Nevertheless, the significance of the choice of metaphors should not be exaggerated. 
First, constitutional phenomena are so diverse that no single metaphor can aptly capture them all. 
For all its advantages, migration is too amorphous a metaphor for the political scientist who sees 
cross-jurisdictional borrowing as choices of institutional design.23 Secondly, the shaping role of 
metaphors is limited. It is true that using the wrong lens can mislead the comparativist’s audience 
and maybe confuse the comparativist himself. But that danger is limited. Metaphors are 
important, as all words and images are, but they are just metaphors. Moreover, their meanings 
often overlap. Far from describing constitutional borrowing in mechanistic terms, its proponents 
see it as a ‘complex and somewhat open-ended phenomenon that, at its greatest reach, embraces 
                                                 
21
 Lee Epstein and Jack Knight, ‘Constitutional Borrowing and Nonborrowing’ (2003) 1 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 196. 
22
 Sujit Choudhry, ‘Migration as a New Metaphor in Comparative Constitutional Law’ in 
Choudhry (n 6), 22.  
23
 Epstein and Knight (n 21).  
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influences of various kinds that cross constitutional borders.’24 This definition is strikingly 
similar to that of constitutional migrations. The same is true for legal transplants. Alan Watson 
defined the object of transplants as legal rules, but by rules he meant ideas.25 ‘What is 
borrowed’—or, what migrates, we may add—‘is very often the idea’.26 This is hardly a linear or 
mechanistic process.  
Since disagreement about words does not suspend the need to use them, in the rest of this 
chapter I use the metaphors of borrowing and transplants, interchangeably. When that lens is too 
limiting, as it will be at times, I switch to the migration lens. The section headings refer to 
transplants, for consistency purposes. I do not use the migration metaphor as the default in order 
to emphasize the continuity between the study of interactions in private and public law. The next 
section turns to this topic.  
III. The Missing Legacy of Comparative Law 
1. The Transplants Debate in Comparative Law 
Alan Watson argued that, in Western private law, jurist-initiated legal transplants have been ‘the 
most fertile source of development’.27 Their success is partly explained by the fact that the 
transplant of legal rules is ‘socially easy’ so that ‘the recipient system does not require any real 
                                                 
24
 Berry Friedman and Cheryl Saunders, ‘Editors’ Introduction to the Symposium on 
Constitutional Borrowing’ (2003) 1 International Journal of Constitutional Law 177.  
25
 Alan Watson, ‘Legal Transplants and Legal Reform’ (1976) 92 Law Quarterly Review 79. 
26
 Alan Watson, ‘Comparative Law and Legal Change’ (1978) 37 Cambridge Law Journal 313, 
315. 
27
 Watson (n 3), 95. 
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knowledge of the social, economic, geographical and political context of the origin and growth 
of the original rule.’28 Longevity is a salient feature of legal rules, which is understandable since 
rules remain largely unaffected by changes in their surroundings.29 Jurists transplant foreign 
rules whenever the(ir) need for coherence and consistency demands it.30 In Watson’s view, 
comparative law is the study of the interaction of legal systems through the voluntary transplant 
of private law rules.  
The transplant approach to comparative legal studies clashes with the ‘mirror theory of 
law’31 which, from Montesquieu to Hegel and Savigny, understood the legal system to reflect in 
its letter the spirit of the community—‘each society reveals though its law the innermost secrets 
of the manner in which it holds men together’.32 Drawing on the hermeneutics of legal meaning, 
Watson’s most outspoken critic, Pierre Legrand, linked the existence of a rule to its 
intersubjective meaning in the community of interpreters: ‘the meaning of a rule is . . ... a 
                                                 
28
 Watson (n 25), 81. 
29
 As Watson later put it (ibid), upon reflection on  
the main point [he] was trying to make in Legal Transplants’, his point is that ‘however historically 
conditioned in their origins might be, rules of private law in their continuing lifetime have no inherent close 
relationship with a particular people, time or place. 
30
 There are different ways of understanding the nature of that need. It can be understood as the 
jurists’ own need for authority, see Watson (n 3), 57ff, 88ff, and Wise (n 16), 5. Alternatively, 
the need can be understood as having deeper roots in the ‘normative self-reference and 
recursivity [that] creates a preference for the internal transfer within the global legal system’, in 
Gunther Teubner, ‘Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends Up in 
New Divergencies’ (1998) 61 Modern Law Review 11, 18. 
31
 William Ewald, ‘Comparative Jurisprudence (II): The Logic of Legal Transplants’ (1995) 43 
American Journal of Comparative Law 489. 
32
 Roberto Unger, Law in Modern Society (1976), 47.  
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function of the interpreter’s epistemological assumptions which are themselves historically and 
culturally conditioned.’33 Since meaning is an essential part of a legal rule and because meaning 
cannot travel, it follows in Legrand’s view that rules—and legal norms more generally—do not 
travel. Meaning changes between the points of origin and destination on a scale of magnitude 
that radically transforms the so-called transplant. While Watson acknowledged that rules are 
altered in the process of transmission,34 Legrand argued that Watson’s formalistic, rule-centered 
approach led him to downplay the scale of transformation. Law’s rich ‘nomos’35 makes 
convergence impossible.36 
So this spectrum has at one end Watson’s account of convergence based on the ubiquity 
of legal transplants and, at the opposite end, Legrand claim that transplants are flat-out 
                                                 
33
 Pierre Legrand, ‘The Impossibility of Legal Transplants’ (1997) 4 Maastricht Journal of 
European and Comparative Law 111, 114. See also Pierre Legrand, Le Droit comparé (3rd edn, 
2009).  
34
 Watson acknowledged that ‘with transmission or the passing of time modifications may well 
occur, but frequently the alternations in the rules have only limited significance’, Watson (n 26). 
But by drawing attention to the direction of change, Legrand makes clear the political stakes of 
comparative method. See generally David Kennedy, ‘The Method and Politics’ in Pierre Legrand 
and Roderick Munday (eds), Comparative Legal Studies: Traditions and Transitions (2003), 
312ff. 
35
 See Robert Cover, ‘Nomos and Narrative’ (1983) 97 Harvard Law Review 4. See also, in this 
context, William P. Alford, ‘On the Limits of “Grand Theory” in Comparative Law’ (1986) 61 
Washington Law Review 945. 
36
 Pierre Legrand, ‘European Legal Systems are Not Converging’ (1996) 45 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 52 . 
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‘impossible’.37 But framing the choice as between convergence through transplants or divergence 
through fidelity to culture is, to use Rodolfo Sacco’s measured but stern warning, ‘too simple’.38 
Much of the value of the transplants debate and its relevance to comparative constitutional law 
derives from subsequent qualifications that present a more nuanced and multilayered relationship 
between law and the broader culture. For instance, scholars have (re)interpreted Watson to argue 
for a ‘weak isolation thesis’39 that the relationship between law and society is complex, not 
inexistent. Understanding legal transplants requires case-by-case study.40 Similarly, the binary 
choice between general culture and legal rules can be enriched by intermediary terms such as 
‘legal formants’41 that capture some of law’s institutional dimension. At the other end of the 
spectrum, James Whitman has praised Legrand’s emphasis on law’s larger cultural context while 
also calling for a dynamic approach to legal culture.42 Cultures change and law’s role in those 
                                                 
37
 This debate replicated in substance an earlier debate between diffusionists and evolutionists in 
anthropology. See Wise (n 16), 16.  
38
 Rodolfo Sacco, ‘Diversity and Uniformity in the Law’ (2011) 49 American Journal of 
Comparative Law 171, 172.  
39
 Ewald (n 31), 500ff.  
40
 Similarly, Edward Wise shares the ‘weak’ reading of Watson’s claim. In Wise (n 16), 3: 
To deny that law merely reflects its social context is not to say that exogenous factors are entirely 
irrelevant. But social and economic factors have a much more limited and attenuated effect than is 
indicated by the a priori assertion that law mirrors society.  
41
 Rodolfo Sacco, ‘Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law’ (1991) 39 
American Journal of Comparative Law 1.  
42
 James Q. Whitman, ‘The Neo-Romantic Turn’ in Legrand and Munday (n 34), 312ff. See also 
John H. Langbein, ‘Cultural Chauvinism in Comparative Law’ (1997) 5 Cardozo Journal of 
International and Comparative Law 41, 46ff. On the same topic, see the essays in the collection 
by David Nelken and Johannes Feest (eds), Adapting Legal Cultures (2001). 
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processes of change must be on the comparativist’s agenda.43  
 The relationship between law and its outside environment or culture is central to the 
transplants debate in comparative law. One of its most interesting aspects has been how 
homogeneity—cultural or otherwise—breaks down under the pressures of social differentiation. 
The same year as Watson’s publication of Legal Transplants, Otto Kahn-Freund noted the 
differential impact of developments such as industrialization, urbanization, and the development 
of communication on political as compared to non-political factors (environmental, cultural, or 
social). Departing from an approach that clusters together all these factors, he argued that rules 
organizing political power are ‘organic’ and resistant to transplantation, whereas other rules are 
‘mechanical’ and can be transplanted. Would-be reformers must thus ask, ‘How far does this rule 
or institution owe its continued existence to a distribution of power in the foreign country which 
we do not share?’44  
                                                 
43
 See also Sujit Choudhry, ‘Migration as a New Metaphor in Comparative Constitutional Law’ 
in Choudhry (n 6), 21: ‘given the centrality of migration to the contemporary practice of 
constitutionalism, the truly interesting question is why and how such changes take place’.  
44
 Otto Kahn-Freund, ‘On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law’ (1974) 34 Modern Law 
Review 1. This assumes that it possible to tell how entrenched a given rule is in the power 
structure. In his answer to Kahn-Freund, Watson voices doubt on that score. See Watson (n 25), 
82. Constitutional rules are closest to the most ‘organic’, non-transplantable end of the spectrum, 
but even areas closer to ‘private law’ might be too. For such an argument in the context of 
company law, see Eric Stein, ‘Uses, Misuses—And Nonuses of Comparative Law’ (1978) 72 
Northwestern University Law Review 198, 204ff. On the idea of transferability of political 
institutions, specifically in the East European context, by reference to Kahn-Freund, see also Eric 
Stein, ‘Post-Communist Constitution-Making: Confessions of a Comparativist’ (1993) 1 New 
European Law Review 421, 438ff.  
 15 
Kahn-Freund’s framework can be helpful for thinking about constitutional borrowing and 
perhaps also about the related but distinct issue of convergence. Factors such as globalization 
have arguably brought about political assimilation and have facilitated constitutional 
borrowing.
45
 Finally, the transplants debate offers a further twist on Kahn-Freund’s framework. 
Gunther Teubner has argued that a study of legal transplants must go beyond political 
differentiation to consider a greater ‘fragmented multiplicity of discourses’ in areas such as 
health, science, or technology. Legal transplants are ‘irritants’46 that trigger reactions from within 
each social subsystem, not only from within legal culture. The norm transplanted changes in that 
process just as it changes the culture(s) of the host system. Mutual irritation is the name for 
‘assimilatory modification’ of traveling legal norms in advanced industrialized societies.47 
                                                 
45
 See eg David Law, ‘Globalization and the Future of Constitutional Rights’ (2008) 102 
Northwestern University Law Review 1277. For a study of globalization on constitutional law, 
see Horatia Muir Watt, ‘Globalization and Comparative Law’ in Reimann and Reinhard (n 9), 
579ff.  
46
 Teubner (n 30).  
47
 Wise (n 16), 17: ‘modifications are so common in cultural borrowing that authorities like 
Malinovski have regarded the process as scarcely less creative than other forms of innovation’. 
See also Horacio Spector, ‘Constitutional Transplants and the Mutation Effect’ (2008) 83 
Chicago-Kent Law Review 129; Stephen Holmes and Cass Sunstein, ‘The Politics of 
Constitutional Revision in Eastern Europe’ in Sanford Levinson (ed), Responding to 
Imperfection: The Theory and Practice of Constitutional Amendment (1995), 275ff.  
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2. Transplants in Private and Public Law  
Since the transplants debate is limited to Western private law, its relevance to comparative 
constitutional law is uncertain.48 Even authors sympathetic to Watson’s approach have found his 
claims about private law not defensible in a public law context. William Ewald has contrasted 
the American Revolution’s dramatic impact on public law with its ‘very little direct effect’49 on 
the system of courts and on private law generally, concluding that ‘the private law . . . displays 
the inertness and stability predicted by Watson’s theory—a stability that persisted even in the 
face of volatile changes elsewhere in the legal order.’50 A similar conclusion could be reached 
about the survival in Eastern Europe of nineteenth-century civil law codes in altered but 
recognizable form throughout the Communist regimes which had profoundly changed the 
constitutional and administrative structure of the state.  
However, this distinction between private and public norms is not universally 
embraced.51 Montesquieu himself did not distinguish, at least not in this context, ‘les lois civiles’ 
and ‘les lois politiques’. In his view, rules of contract and property are just as embedded in the 
                                                 
48
 It has been argued that the transplants debate can no more apply to public law than it can apply 
beyond the ambit of European legal systems. See Ewald (n 31), 503.  
49
 William B. Ewald, ‘The American Revolution and the Evolution of Law’ (1994) 42 American 
Journal of Comparative Law Supplement 1, 9 (1994).  
50
 Ibid 13. 
51
 The question of the transplantability of private versus public law rules is related but not 
identical to the question whether there is a substantive difference between private and public law. 
Whatever the answer to the latter question, it remains possible that the rules of contracts or 
property are different—in a way that affects their transplantability—from norms of 
administrative or constitutional law. 
 17 
spirit and soil of a place—and therefore unmovable across space—as rules about political 
power.52 Contemporary scholars sometimes make no distinction between private and public and 
public norms.53 On what grounds can such a distinction rest?  
There is, first, a widespread perception that rules of private law are more technical than 
constitutional rules. The latter structure and channel political power, whereas private law rules 
are politically neutral and regulate the interaction among individuals in their private capacity. As 
Watson argued, the ‘indifference’54 of political rulers gives jurists leeway to transplant rules of 
private law that do not affect their office. In this view, constitutional transplants remain possible 
but they depend on the alignment of the rulers’ interests. Their study is highly contextual and 
varies case by case. It follows that transplanting private law rules is ‘socially easy’ whereas the 
transplant of public law rules is less common, albeit not impossible, and, in any event, not easy.  
Now, it is true that some property and contract rules are more technical than, for instance, 
notoriously open-ended bill of rights provisions. But their technical nature should not obscure 
                                                 
52
 The equal treatment of all laws was, as Kahn-Freund put it, ‘decisive for Montesquieu’s entire 
political and jurisprudential thinking and determining his place in the history of ideas’, Kahn-
Freund (n 44), 7. Unsurprisingly, Alan Watson argued that ‘Montesquieu badly—very badly—
underestimated the amount of successful borrowing which had been going on, and was going on, 
in his day’, in Watson (n 25), 80.  
53
 See Jonathan Miller, ‘A Typology of Legal Transplants Using Sociology, Legal History and 
Argentine Examples to Explain the Transplant Process’ (2003) 51 American Journal of 
Comparative Law 839.  
54
 Alan Watson, cited in Ewald (n 31), 501. 
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their political stakes.55 Conversely, even open-ended constitutional provisions are not self-
evidently at the mercy of political factors, lest they should not be recognized as ‘law’.56 
Secondly, the above explanation ignores the existence of periods of intensive constitutional 
borrowing when the ideological and/or reputational interests of political elites are sufficiently 
stable to make the transplant of public rules predictable and ‘socially easy’. 
Another interpretation of the distinction between private and public rules underscores 
their different radiating ranges. In this view, ‘contract and tort law, for instance, only determine 
the way in which we should behave in some sort of bracketed interactions. But constitutional law 
has a deeper impact.’57 This ‘deeper impact’ can be interpreted as a reference to the expressive 
function of constitutional norms. Constitutional norms are more complex signifiers than private 
norms, which regulate the transactional or non-transactional relations among individuals.58 
Constitutional norms represent the will of the ultimate sovereign: the people. In some historical 
circumstances, ‘the people’ may want to borrow from a foreign system precisely for expressive 
reasons. But self-determination and the expressive nature of constitutional norms do explain why 
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 See eg Duncan Kennedy, ‘The Political Stakes in “Merely Technical” Issues of Contract Law’ 
(2001) 1 European Review of Private Law 7. 
56
 The classic is Herbert Wechsler, ‘Toward Neutral Principles in Constitutional Law’ (1959) 73 
Harvard Law Review 1.  
57
 Carlos F. Rosenkrantz, ‘Against Borrowing and Other Nonauthoritative Uses of Foreign Law’ 
(2003) 1 International Journal of Constitutional Law 269, 295.  
58
 For instance, Brenda Crossman has studied how cultural representations travel in the in the 
context of constitutional interpretations of equality striking down the ban on same-sex marriage. 
Brenda Crossman, ‘Migrating Marriages and Comparative Constitutionalism’ in Choudhry (n 6), 
209ff.  
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constitutional transplants can be more onerous than the transplant of more technical rules, such 
as, for example, legal rules regarding bankruptcy.59 The problem with this interpretation lies 
elsewhere. In many legal systems, the expressive dimension of constitutional norms is much less 
poignant than in the United States, for instance because their constitutions are easily amendable 
and/or their endurance is nowhere near that of the US Constitution. Furthermore, in some legal 
systems rules of private law can have as much if not greater expressive value. It is a well-known 
saying that the Code civil is France’s ‘real’ Constitution. 
Finally, private and public law norms can be distinguished as to their transplantability by 
reference to legal history of the kind on which Watson relies. But such arguments will likely 
leave unexplained the post-Second World War worldwide spread of constitutionalism. Another 
ground for distinction refers to disparities in the ease of implementation. The literature on the 
‘transplant effect’60 emphasizes the need for institutional structures to ensure the interpretation of 
a norm. Since institutional structures themselves do not migrate, the effects of the transplanted 
rule in the receiving system will be different from those in the system of origin. While such a 
conclusion requires empirical support, it might be the case that the support system that 
constitutions require is more extensive than that of private law rules.61 
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 See Frederick Schauer, ‘The Politics and Incentives of Legal Transplantation’ in Joseph Nye Jr 
and John Donahue (eds), Governance in a Globalizing World (2000), 259. 
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 Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor, and Jean-Francois Richard, ‘The Transplant Effect’ 
(2003) 51 American Journal of Comparative Law 163. 
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 My aim in questioning the distinction between private and public law norms in this 
context is not to imply that claims about the transplantability of private rules apply equally in the 
context of public, and specifically constitutional, norms. Rather, it is to suggest that the 
transplants debate in comparative law could be of use, heuristically and beyond, in the context of 
comparative constitutional law.  
IV. The Anatomy of Constitutional Transplants  
1. Object  
The study of the object of constitutional transplants begins with constitutional text. The smallest 
unit of transplant can be a rule of constitutional structure—for instance the ‘constructive no 
confidence’ procedure borrowed from the German Basic Law into the 1992 amendments to the 
post-Communist Polish constitutional arrangement62—or an institution, such as the 
Ombudsman.63 Fundamental rights provisions can also be the result of borrowing—or non-
borrowing. Sujit Choudhry has documented the decision not to include in the Canadian Charter 
of Rights a US-style due process clause for fear that the judiciary might use it to usher in 
Lochner-like laissez-faire constitutional doctrines.64  
But an exclusive textual focus on discrete and insular constitutional provisions is 
problematic. Like legal formants in comparative law, discreet constitutional norms are often 
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 Andrzej Rapaczynski, ‘Constitutional Politics in Poland: A Report on the Constitutional 
Committee of the Polish Parliament’ (1991) 58 University of Chicago Law Review 595, 629.  
63
 Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer, European Ombudsman-Institutions (2008).  
64
 Sujit Choudhry, ‘The Lochner Era and Comparative Constitutionalism’ (2004) 2 International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 1, 16ff.  
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interrelated—in obvious or less than obvious ways—with other provisions, doctrines, or larger 
institutional structures. Mark Tushnet refers to this characteristic as ‘modularity’.65 He gives as 
example how legislative standing in the United States is related to provisions which authorize 
judicial review, and generally to the overall structure of the separation of powers.66 The overall 
structure of implementation can also be part of modularity, broadly understood. In the case of 
hate speech, the choice between a US-style protection and a system that does not extend such 
protection is at least partly correlated with the degree to which the enforcement of criminal law is 
centralized. Centralization affects the possibility of abusive restrictions on speech and thus the 
level of constitutional protection for speech.67  
An even larger unit of migration can be the regime itself. Examples include the 
borrowing of US presidentialism in Latin America and the borrowing of mixed, or semi-
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 Mark Tushnet, ‘Returning with Interest: Observations on Some Putative Benefits of Studying 
Comparative Constitutional Law’ (1998) 1 University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional 
Law 325, 330. See also Mark Tushnet, ‘Interpreting Constitutions Comparatively: Some 
Cautionary Notes, with Reference to Affirmative Action’ (2004) 36 Connecticut Law Review 
649.  
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 See Mark Tushnet, ‘Some Reflections on Method in Comparative Constitutional Law’ in 
Choudhry (n 6), 76ff. For another discussion of the importance of institutional structure, 
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presidential, systems in Eastern Europe from the French Fifth Republic.68 Large structure 
borrowing is almost always subject to assimilatory modifications such that the final results are 
often a pastiche. For instance, the 1991 Romanian Constitution borrowed the French mixed 
regime of the Fifth Republic but, for historical reasons having to do with its recent period of 
dictatorship, it limited the powers of the president by not borrowing the powers of the French 
president to dissolve the legislature.69  
In addition to overlooking modularity, an exclusive focus on constitutional text glosses 
over the difference between constitutional text and constitutional practice. The necessity of 
looking behind text is perhaps greater with constitutional norms than with rules of private law.70 
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 For a study showing the complexity of the East European constitutions, see generally Rett R. 
Ludwikowski, ‘“Mixed” Constitutions—Product of an East-Central European Constitutional 
Melting Pot’ (1998) 16 Boston University International Law Journal 1. For a study of the 
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The phenomenon of ‘constitutions without constitutionalism’71—constitutional text that lacks 
political and cultural traction—is known beyond the ambit of African post-colonial constitutions 
for which it was coined. Since the standard reference to the phantasmagoric generosity of the text 
of the 1936 Soviet Constitution is no longer available, we will have to settle for the ‘rights’ 
provision of the North Korean Constitution.72 Now, of course, structural discrepancy between 
text and practice is also known, mutatis mutandis, to constitutional democracies, especially when 
there is a hierarchy within constitutional provisions whereby some norms—for instance, social 
and economic guarantees—are ‘under-enforced’.73  
Constitutional method too can be the object of migration. The most notable contemporary 
example is the proportionality method which migrated from its origins in nineteenth-century 
Prussian administrative law to many national and supranational courts around the world. As Alec 
Stone Sweet and Jud Mathews have argued,  
                                                                                                                                                             
mentioned in Heinz Klug, ‘Participating in the Design: Constitution-Making in South Africa’ 
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By the end of the 1990s, virtually every effective system of constitutional justice in the world, with the 
partial exception of the United States, had embraced the main tenets of proportionality analysis . . . [It has 
become] a foundational element of global constitutionalism.74  
So fast and far has proportionality spread that one scholar has called it the ‘most successful legal 
transplant of the twentieth century’.75  
Two final points are in order. First, connecting the dots of the smaller-scale units (rules, 
methods, regimes, institutions, doctrines, discourses), entire legal paradigms can be the object of 
constitutional migration. Lorraine Weinrib has described the post-war juridical/human rights 
paradigm that characterizes liberal democracies as including elements such as the proportionality 
method, fundamental rights, judicial review, and a certain understanding of constitutional 
values.76 Secondly, the object of migration can also be a constitutional insight or a contrasting 
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 Alec Stone Sweet and Jud Mathews, ‘Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism’ 
(2008) 47 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 72, 74, 160. See also David Beatty, The 
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see E. Thomas Sullivan and Richard S. Frase, Proportionality Principles in American Law 
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 See Lorraine E. Weinrib, ‘The Postwar Paradigm and American Exceptionalism’ in Choudhry 
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image that shows foreign peer courts adopting solutions that the host legal system rejects as 
unfathomable. The South African constitutional equality jurisprudence has been invoked to such 
effect in US constitutional law.77 
2. Timing  
‘No one begins writing a constitution from scratch’78—at least, not anymore. But tracing the 
origins of the first draft, so to speak, is more important for a constitution than for rules of private 
law. Writing about the latter, Alan Watson noted that ‘however historically conditioned in their 
origins might be, rules of private law in their continuing lifetime have no inherent close 
relationship with a particular people, time or place.’79 Not so with (written80) constitutions. The 
distinction between voluntary and involuntary transplants is especially important in this context. 
At one end of the spectrum, we find examples such as foreign inspiration of the American 
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Founders or the borrowing between the states in the pre-revolutionary period in America.81 At 
the other end are the post-war Japanese Constitution,82 the German Basic Law, and the post-
colonial constitutions of African nations.83 External influence on the 1995 Bosnian Constitution, 
the 2005 Iraqi Constitution, and the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan places them closer to the 
same end of the spectrum.84 There are other situations wherein voluntariness is harder to 
ascertain. For instance, East European countries, which were in principle free to disregard, in the 
constitution-making process after the fall of Communism, the myriad recommendations of the 
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 G. Alan Tarr, ‘Models and Fashions in State Constitutionalism’ (1998) Wisconsin Law Review 
729. For a wonderful example of foreign inspiration in the context of the American Founding, 
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Council of Europe and the European Community regarding the borrowing of specific 
constitutional institutions, but at the unpalatable price of being denied membership of these 
organizations.85 
Constitutional borrowing can also occur at the interpretative stage in the life cycle of a 
constitution. Judges around the world are reading, citing, and generally ‘engaging’, as Vicki 
Jackson put it,86 the decisions of their foreign peers. Over the past few decades, the dialogue of 
constitutional courts has become a major venue for the migration of constitutional ideas.87  
It would be interesting to compare judges’ roles in this context with the roles that Watson 
argues jurists played in the legal transplants of private law rules. Among the factors contributing 
to the creation in the constitutional context of a ‘global community of courts’88 are, in addition to 
domestic legal developments, external developments including the increased availability online 
of foreign materials, the globalization of legal education, and the ease of travel and 
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communication which have set the conditions for an epistemic community of constitutional 
decision-makers.89  
The frequency of foreign citations varies across space and even in time within the same 
jurisdiction. For instance, D.M. Davis has argued that, after an early period when the South 
African Constitutional Court drew heavily on foreign law, over time the number of references 
decreased.90 This is noteworthy considering that section 39(c) of the South African Constitution 
provides that courts interpreting the Bill of Rights ‘may consider foreign law’. 
The lack of similar authorization has made the legitimacy of judicial borrowing the 
subject of intense debate in US constitutional law and politics. Even though the number of cases 
wherein the Supreme Court has cited foreign law is small by comparison to other jurisdictions,91 
controversy has engulfed courts, the academy, and even Congress.92 Critics such as Justice 
Antonin Scalia have acknowledged the legitimacy of drawing inspiration from foreign models at 
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the constitutional drafting stage, but have argued that the migration of foreign constitutional 
ideas at the interpretative stage erodes democratic self-government.93 To some extent, this is a 
surprising position. The authority of foreign law in constitutional domestic interpretation is not 
content-independent. Rather, it depends on how persuasive a judge finds a particular legal idea.94 
Contrast this to the precedential authority of the US Supreme Court decisions in Argentina under 
the 1853 constitutional regime, which had largely copied the US Constitution. Judicial decisions 
interpreting the US Constitution received precedential authority as if they were the decisions of 
an Argentinian court.95 But, as the next section shows in the broader context of the justification 
of transplants, no such argument has been advanced in the contemporary debate.96  
3. Motivations  
Voluntary constitutional borrowing has no single or simple motivation or set of motivations. One 
possible classification of the different motivations discussed in the literature mentions 
functionalist, reputational, normative, sociological, and, finally, ‘chance’ borrowing. 
The first motivation is that the proposed ‘cost-saving’97 transplant ‘works’ in the host 
system. Rather than reinventing the wheel, a particular system should, in this view, borrow 
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solutions that have already been tested in other systems. Similar functionalist motivations have 
been advanced in private law where the motivation for legal transplant has been ‘the quality of a 
given foreign solution’.98 One difficulty with these accounts is how to define what ‘works’. 
Given the importance of constitutional modularity at institutional, doctrinal, and perhaps even 
professional levels, understanding constitutional function requires tools that functionalism itself 
cannot provide.99 
A second motivation is reputational; borrowing has ‘legitimacy generating’100 effects. For 
example, it can signal to the world community the breaking with an undemocratic past.101 When 
courts are the agents of borrowing, they can import traditions that are lacking in their own 
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systems and on which judges can then build ‘local’ doctrines over time.102 Moreover, judicial 
borrowing helps courts to deliver decisions that appear objective and impartial, which is 
particularly valuable to newly establish constitution courts. Engagement with foreign peers can 
also boost the external prestige of courts even when it leads to the rejection of foreign 
approaches.103           
Reputational effects also accrue on political actors and motivate borrowing at the 
constitutional drafting stage. Lee Epstein and Jack Knight have studied borrowing in the context 
of the choices of institutional design that constitutional drafters must make. They have argued 
that political actors seek to maximize their own preferences and reputation when exercising those 
choices. The authors  
analyze borrowing—institutional choices, really—as a bargaining process among relevant political actors, 
with their decisions reflecting their relative influences, preferences, and beliefs at the moment when the 
new institution is introduced, along with (and critically so) their level of uncertainty about future political 
circumstances.104   
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Similarly, Ran Hirschl has explained the worldwide migration of the idea of judicial 
review of legislation as a mechanism by which disadvantaged elites promote their political self-
interest. Hirschl writes that  
the current global trend toward judicial empowerment through constitutionalization is part of a broader 
process whereby self-interested political and economic elites, while they profess support for democracy and 
sustained development, attempt to insulate policy-making from the vagaries of democratic politics.105  
Other authors interpret the interests of elites somewhat more broadly. For instance, David Law 
has identified among the forces of conversion toward what Hirschl calls ‘new constitutionalism’ 
the state’s competition for investment capital. Because capital is free to move wherever it sees 
fit, attracting it—and thus securing the basis for economic development—requires that 
constitutional systems offer investors property rights protected by an independent judiciary.106 
At least two more kinds of motivations deserve mention at this stage. Normative 
universalist motivations see the spread of liberal constitutionalism—both constitutional structure 
(separation of powers, checks and balances, independent judiciary) and bill of rights—as the 
recognition of a universal set of principles for organizing political power in a way that protects 
individual freedom in the modern state. Writing in the context of the constitution-making in post-
Communist Eastern Europe, Richard Epstein has argued that it is little surprising that virtually all 
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new modern constitutions are slight variations on a common theme.107 There are also 
sociological motivations, of the kind discussed above in the context of judicial dialogue. 
Finally, it is an interesting question what role ‘chance’ borrowings, that is, borrowings 
that lack any motivation, play. The process of constitutional borrowing seems fraught with 
dangers of misunderstanding.108 Consider the possibility of mistaken interpretation of foreign 
law. Watson intriguingly claimed that ‘foreign law can be influential even when it is totally 
misunderstood’.109 How accidental are such mistakes? That answer turns on whether the 
comparativist’s approach to legal culture has any room for the possibility of accidents.110 
4. Patterns  
Patterns of migration require an assessment of constitutional proximity. Rarely is such proximity 
a function of physical distance. More commonly, culture, history, reputation, politics, and 
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ideology shape perceptions of constitutional space and determine the direction of constitutional 
migrations.  
Let us first begin by distinguishing on the y-axis between vertical and horizontal 
constitutional migrations. Vertical migrations occur between different jurisdictional levels, for 
instance between national and subnational levels, such as the units comprising a federation. For 
example, the drafters of the Russian Constitution were reportedly inspired by state constitutions 
in the United States.111 The most common vertical migrations originate from the supranational 
toward the national level, as when the state must implement at the constitutional level human 
rights obligations assumed under an international treaty.112 But these can also be complex 
migrations. One example is the spread of the proportionality method from national to 
supranational jurisdictions such as the European Court of Justice, from which it travels to a 
national system that had not been on the receiving end of horizontal migrations from the initial 
source.113 
Horizontal migrations occur between similarly situated jurisdictions. The United States, 
Germany, the United Kingdom, and France are models of constitutional structure and the source 
of most worldwide borrowing. An interesting phenomenon, related to the reputation of 
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constitutional models, occurs in situations of repeated borrowing which create ‘transplant 
biases’. As Alan Watson explains it, transplant bias refers to situations when  
a system’s receptivity to a particular outside law, which is distinct from acceptance based on a thorough 
examination of possible alternatives. Thus, it means for instance a system’s readiness to accept Roman law 
rules because they are Roman law rules, or French rules because they are French rules.114  
At first glance, it seems that constitutional borrowings are somewhat insulated from the dangers 
of transplant biases. To the extent such biases rely on ‘habits’,115 their relevance is mitigated by 
the low frequency of opportunities for constitution-drafting. There are, however, opportunities 
for repeated borrowing at the interpretative stage.  
The formation of transplant bias assumes accessibility, hence a process of socialization in 
which legal education and legal culture make particular foreign sources intelligible.116 
Language plays an essential role, although the spread of English tends to obscure its 
importance. As we will see, the use of a lingua franca heightens the dangers of nominalism and 
creates an appearance of constitutional convergence that can be misleading. The contrast 
between comparative constitutional law and comparative law is particularly stark in this respect, 
in the sense that language and translation are among the grand topics of comparative law but are 
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virtually inexistent in the constitutional field. A second aspect of intelligibility and accessibility 
involves the question whether ‘legal families’117 have an impact on constitutional borrowing. 
Stephen Gardbaum’s work on the Commonwealth model of constitutionalism shows the shaping 
effect of legal traditions.118 Similarly, Tom Ginsburg has shown that the 1992 Constitution of 
Mongolia rejected the American and Japanese-style systems to decentralized constitutional 
review partly because of Mongolia’s civil law origins in a Soviet-inspired legal system.119 A 
comprehensive study of the impact of the civil law/common law legal traditions on constitutional 
borrowing remains to be conducted.  
History is of course a central factor that shapes perceptions of constitutional proximity. 
Scholars have studied how English-speaking Africa used the Westminster model and bicameral 
legislatures, separation of powers, judicial review, and bill of rights; French-speaking Africa 
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adapted a French model.120 As far as geographical proximity is concerned, this factor plays a 
limited role in phenomena of voluntary constitutional migration. To take only one example, there 
are relatively few African influences in the South African Constitution.121 By contrast, the post-
Communist constitutional arrangement in Albania was influenced by neighbouring Greece and 
Italy.122  
V. The Justification of Constitutional Transplants: The Case of Foreign Law  
 
Comparative law is law.123 As law, it must address the normative justification for constitutional 
borrowing, and more broadly the conditions for its success. This section maps normative 
approaches to constitutional borrowing in the context of a particularly controversial type of 
borrowing, already introduced in the previous section, namely the use of foreign law by US 
courts in the process of constitutional interpretation. I use this debate not because it is 
representative of global trends—in fact, the opposite is true—but rather in order to exhibit the 
richness of the normative debate about constitutional borrowing, especially with regard to the 
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relationship between law and its outside cultural, social, and political environment.124 We will 
find little trace of the transplants debate from comparative law in the constitutional realm. 
Judicial references to foreign law in the constitutional context have been roundly 
criticized in the United States as being haphazard, lacking in method, and for being an 
unprincipled tool available for use whenever and however judges wish. Critics worry that 
fundamental methodological questions remain unanswered. For instance, to which jurisdictions 
should courts refer? How can judges be prevented from picking and choosing the jurisdictions 
that support their own choices? How does foreign law affect the integrity of the judicial process 
and how should the accuracy and relevance of foreign citations be checked? etc.125 These are 
undoubtedly important questions. They are also questions which reflect the fact that 
constitutional borrowings are not perceived to occur within what comparativists call a ‘legal 
family’, that is, within a community of legal systems that share fundamental methods and 
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assumptions.126 But perhaps even belonging to a legal family would be insufficient given the 
special role of the constitution as a charter of self-government. In the context of constitutional 
borrowing, unprincipled means ‘undemocratic’.127  
To understand what makes borrowing undemocratic, recall that in comparative private 
law transplants are considered the most fertile source of change. A similar claim in the 
constitutional context would be an overstatement (revolutions are more ‘fertile’ than legal 
transplants . . .), but at least it identifies the normative pedigree of opposition to change. Thus, 
changes must be resisted as undemocratic unless they originate organically from within the body 
politic and, according to the self-referential logic of the constitution, they follow the mechanisms 
provided for in the constitutional text. 
This position allows for a number of variations. One variation, call it a normative 
universalist claim, is that change via judicial constitutional borrowing is undemocratic under any 
version of constitutional self-government, save when the sovereign people have authorized it. A 
different, more culturally specific, position singles out factors such as history, politics, and the 
environment which make constitutional self-government incompatible with the practice of 
judicial borrowing. For instance, Jed Rubenfeld has contrasted American democratic 
constitutionalism, which sees the constitution as ‘the product of a national participatory political 
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process, though which people commit to writing the fundamental values or principles that will 
govern their society’,128 with European self-government where national participatory processes 
are less important than the protection of human rights, including the rights of minorities and the 
establishment of the rule of law. 
On its face, this is a descriptive approach. It does not take a position on whether cultures 
can change, whether these particular constitutional cultures can change, or whether they should 
change.129 Now, presumably change is possible. After all, these cultures have been shaped by 
history and history has not yet come to an end. So the critical question is how cultures change. 
A strong culturalist approach to constitutional law argues that cultures cannot change 
intentionally. Paul Kahn has forcefully argued that ‘the rule of law is a cultural practice’, and 
thus ‘a cultural approach begins by bracketing off the study of law from the practice of reforming 
the law’.130 To try to change legal culture is to misunderstand legal culture. Hence, comparative 
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constitutionalism, when aiming at reform, including through but not limited to constitutional 
borrowing, misunderstands—or worse, it instrumentalizes131—constitutional culture. The point 
of comparative law is to understand, not to reform.132 A particularly illuminating analogy comes 
from Alan Watson who compared the purported comprehensiveness of constitutional law with 
that of a religious faith. Just as one need not—indeed, may not—reach out for answers to other 
faiths, so here one should not reach beyond the ambit of the US Constitution, as the foundation 
of America’s civic religion.133 
Culturalism’s emphasis on constitutional self-government coupled with its anti-
functionalist methodology explain its appeal and relevance. In a different context, scholars of 
African constitutionalism have made the argument that constitutions must ‘grow’ organically. 
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Invoked in this context is the survival of the ‘presidentialist character of Africa’s constitutional 
politics’134 despite the textual provisions of many postcolonial constitutions in many Sub-
Saharan constitutions.135 The justification of transplants depends on how one conceptualizes that 
relationship between law and culture. How, then, is judicial borrowing defended?  
In the context of foreign law, functionalism in comparative constitutional law can take 
the form of crude instrumentalism or more sophisticated pragmatism.136 While crude 
instrumentalism has no defenders, as long as the use of foreign law lacks a methodology, judicial 
borrowing will be criticized as an inherently unprincipled tool that can be used strategically.137 
The pragmatist justification reverts to the ‘it works’ rationale.138 Foreign law can shed an 
                                                 
134
 H. Kwasi Prempeh, ‘Africa’s Constitutionalism Revival: False Start or New Dawn?’ (2007) 5 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 469, 497, at 498:  
The long absence in postcolonial Africa of a tradition of parliamentary autonomy has severly handicapped 
Africa’s legislature in defining or protecting their institutional interests and prerogatives. Despite new 
openings and opportunities to assert a meaningful role for parliaments in Africa’s post-authoritarian 
constitutional politics, contemporary legislature-executive relationships continue to be defined by 
conventions established under the executive-dominated ancient regime.  
135
 See generally Ruth Gordon, ‘Growing Constitutions’ (1999) 1 University of Pennsylvania 
Journal of Constitutional Law 528. 
136
 For a discussion of functionalist explanations of constitutional transformation, see Ran 
Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy (2004), 34ff (discussing functionalist, evolutionary, and 
institutional economic theories of constitutional transformation); Mark Tushnet, ‘Some 
Reflections on Method in Comparative Constitutional Law’ in Choudhry (n 6), 76ff (discussing 
functionalism in the context of constitutional structure).  
137
 See eg Ernest Young, ‘The Trouble with Global Constitutionalism’ (2003) 38 Texas 
International Law Review 527. 
138
 Of course, the question is, ‘it works’ for what? Eg in the context of the Argentine 1853 
Constitution, borrowing from US law was done for the purpose of replicating the US success at 
 43 
‘empirical light’,139 in Justice Breyer’s words, on issues of constitutional structure such as 
federalism as well as fundamental rights.140  
Among other defences of foreign law, Anne-Marie Slaughter has proposed a broader 
explanation of inter-court borrowing as the outcome of the disintegration of states into networks 
of judges, legislators, and executives that reach across to their foreign peers.141 Both professional 
and sociological factors contribute to the creation of ‘a global community of courts’. Slaughter’s 
account is compatible with a dialogical model.142 According to this model, the use of foreign law 
is a means by which a constitutional system or culture engages with the outside world.143 The 
outcome of such engagement is to better understand the presuppositions of one’s own 
constitutional culture and legal system and, presumably, to change whatever aspects one does not 
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like and has a mandate to change. Since the national judge is always a filter, foreign law as 
having persuasive authority and its usage is therefore not undemocratic.  
Stronger views of the authority of foreign law are also possible.144 Jeremy Waldron has 
argued that foreign law is new jus gentium (the law of nations).145 Referring specifically to 
situations of emerging world consensus, such as the ban on the death penalty for juvenile 
offenders, Waldron argues that, just like in science, consensus provides ‘an established body of 
legal insight, reminding [one] that the particular problem had been confronted before and that 
they . . . should think it through in the company of those who have already dealt with it.’146 
Common answers form an area of ‘overlap, duplication, mutual elaboration, and the checking 
and rechecking of results that is characteristic to true science.’147 This theory provides a strong 
justification for the use of foreign law, but one that is limited to situations of emerging world 
consensus. More recently, it has been argued that the cosmopolitan ideal in constitutional law 
can justify constitutional borrowing by judges without regard to the existence of consensus.148  
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VI. Conclusion: The Problem of Convergence 
Reflecting on the history of comparative law, Rudolf Schlesinger noted that periods of 
‘contractive comparisons’, when the emphasis is on differences between legal systems, alternate 
with periods of ‘integrative comparison’, when the focus is on similarities.149 It is perhaps too 
soon to tell if the same evolution will shape the field of comparative constitutional law. It is 
clear, however, that a debate is under way on whether and on what scale constitutional 
migrations are leading or can lead to constitutional convergence.150 At one level, at least some 
degree of convergence seems unquestionable. The world constitutional map looks drastically 
different today than it did half a century ago. The complex phenomenon of globalization makes 
further convergence all but inevitable.151 At the same time, recent empirical studies cast doubt on 
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whether constitutional systems are converging.152 Moreover, convergence might not be desirable 
if it stifles democratic experimentation and shuns local expertise and traditions.153  
In this context, the pervasiveness of the English language in the comparative 
constitutional materials shapes the comparative landscape and somewhat artificially enhances the 
perception of congruence. Unlike comparative private lawyers, who are trained to reflect on the 
problem of translation, the comparative constitutional lawyer has few such concerns. The trap of 
nominalism becomes particularly worrisome.154 This is the trap that similar-sounding concepts 
share an identical meaning. Even when these legal concepts are the outcome of constitutional 
borrowing, we have seen that their meaning changes in the course of borrowing. A healthy dose 
of comparative sensibility helps at this stage.  
Comparative constitutional law as a field can benefit from engaging with the transplants 
debate in comparative law, in particular with respect to topics such as convergence and 
divergence, the relationship between law and culture, and the importance of language and 
professional culture. Conversely, that debate, and comparative law more generally, can benefit 
from a study of constitutional borrowings and from the normative finesse that characterizes 
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comparative constitutionalism. This mutually beneficial dialogue also lays the ground for an 
integrative account of legal transplants, borrowings, and migrations.  
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